Making Statements and Approval Voting

Enriqueta Aragones (), Itzhak Gilboa () and Andrew Weiss ()

No 1531, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Keywords: Approval voting; Abstention; Statements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2005-08
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