Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Dirk Bergemann () and Stephen Morris ()

No 1609R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function: this definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Virtual implementation; Robust implementation; Rationalizability; Ex-post incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
Date: Written
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Published in Theoretical Economics (2009), 4: 45-88

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