Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Dirk Bergemann () and Stephen Morris ()

No 1629, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Rationalizability; Ex post equilibrium; Belief free types; Payo types; Belief types; Supermodular games; Potential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ict
Date: Written
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Working Paper: Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (2007)
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