Financial Control of a Competitive Economy without Randomness

Ioannis Karatzas, Martin Shubik and William D. Sudderth
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Ioannis Karatzas: Columbia University
William D. Sudderth: University of Minnesota

No 1681, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered.

Keywords: Dynamic programming; Public goods; Bureaucracy; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 H23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-pbe
Date: 2008-10
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