Rationalizable Implementation

Dirk Bergemann () and Stephen Morris ()

No 1697, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

Keywords: Implementation; Complete information; Rationalizability; Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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