El Farol Revisited: A Note on Emergence, Game Theory and Society

Martin Shubik ()
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Martin Shubik: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/shubik.htm

No 1733, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: The El Farol Bar problem with coordination is reconsidered in terms and extended with consideration of further context.

Keywords: Random; search; context (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2009-10

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