Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence

Johannes Horner (), Stefano Lovo and Tristan Tomala
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Johannes Horner: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/horner.htm
Stefano Lovo: HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC
Tristan Tomala: HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC

No 1739, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.

Keywords: Repeated games with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
Date: 2009-10

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