Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

No 726, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [5, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

Keywords: Optimal symmetric cartel equilibria; cartels; imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984-10
Note: CFP 656.
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 39(1), 1986

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