Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()
Additional contact information
Donald Campbell: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Jerry Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University

No 43, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.

Keywords: Pareto; anonymity; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-knm and nep-mic
Date: Written 2006-09-11
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://web.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp43.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Beth A Freeborn ().