Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()
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Donald Campbell: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Jerry Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University

No 43, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.

Keywords: Pareto; anonymity; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-knm and nep-mic
Date: Written
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