Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()
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Donald Campbell: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Jerry Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University

No 49, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial when individual preferences are restricted to a rich subset of profiles.

Keywords: chromatic graphs; generalized IIA; social welfare function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: Written
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