A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals

Lauren Merrill ()
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Lauren Merrill: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

No 60, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.

Keywords: majority rule; Condorcet domain; dicatorial rule; stratefy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: Written
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