A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals

Lauren Merrill ()
Additional contact information
Lauren Merrill: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

No 60, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.

Keywords: majority rule; Condorcet domain; dicatorial rule; stratefy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: 2007-10-03
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp60.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Beth A Freeborn ().