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Common Property, Information, and Cooperation: Commercial Fishing in the Bering Sea

Robert L. Hicks, Alan Haynie () and Kurt Schnier ()
Additional contact information
Alan Haynie: Alaska Fisheries Science Center,National Marine Fisheries Service
Kurt Schnier: Department of Economics,Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

No 80, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of social norms as conducive to cooperation. This research empirically investigates cooperative behavior in a natural resource extraction industry in which the provision of a public good (bycatch avoidance) in the Alaskan flatfish fishery is essential to the duration of the fishing season, and an information provision mechanism exists to relay information to all individuals. Using a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior our results show that conditionally cooperative behavior is prevalent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints tighten.

Keywords: cooperative games; spatial econometrics; fisheries; location choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q22 C25 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2008-11-14

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