Gestion bancaire du risque de non-remboursement des crédits aux entreprises: une revue de la littérature
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University
Bankers suffer a risk of non repayment of their credits to firms. This risk can be reduced during the two phases of the credit : at the time of the credit granting by a risk of failure analysis and the design of incentive contracts, and during its life, by an active monitoring of the credit.
Keywords: banque; contrats incitatifs; notation; octroi de crédit; risque; crédit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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