A value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

Emilio Calvo () and Esther Gutierrez ()
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Esther Gutierrez: University Pais Vasco

No 311, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding the cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value [Shapley, 1953] is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs of the coalitions, and the Solidarity value [Nowak and Radzik, 1994] to obtain the payoffs of the players inside each coalition.

Keywords: Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-gth and nep-net
Date: 2011-02
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0311

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