Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions

Olivier Compte (), Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky () and Thierry A. Verdier ()

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favor in exchange for a bribe.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; COMPETITION; CORRUPTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2000-01

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