On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

V Bhaskar

No 30, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result to the battle of sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

Date: 1995
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