The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

Sylvester Eijffinger () and Marco Hoeberichts ()

No 44, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker. It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and empirically. There appears to be a trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness. Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, we want to identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for the countries participating in EMU.

Keywords: conservativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=3363 (application/postscript)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=3362 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199644

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Series data maintained by Corry Stuyts ().