On the unique d1 equilibrium in the Stackelberg model with asymmetric information

Maarten Janssen and Emiel Maasland ()

No 106, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly reveal-ing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

Keywords: Stackelberg; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:1997106

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