Noise trader risk and the political economy of privatization

Simon Grant () and John Quiggin ()

No 104, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: The 'noise trader' model of De Long et al. provides a plausible account of the determination of the equity premium. Extension of the model to allow for privatization of publicly-owned assets yields insights into the positive political economy of privatization and into the normative question of how policies should be evaluated in the presence of mistaken beliefs.

Keywords: noise; trader (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2001
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=4300 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2001104

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Series data maintained by Corry Stuyts ().