Using employer hiring behavior to test the educational signaling hypothesis

James Albrecht () and J.C. van Ours
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J.C. van Ours: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 49, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We nd that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

JEL-codes: I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ltv
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Journal Article: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200149

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