On strategy and relative skill in poker

M. Dreef, Peter Borm () and B. van der Genugten
Additional contact information
B. van der Genugten: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 59, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. It approximates optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses some strategic insights. In addition, the paper studies the relative skill level of this game.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2002
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=4363 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Series data maintained by Corry Stuyts ().