Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison

Wieland Müller, Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann ()

No 124, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e.ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested. More efficient workers also earn higher wages. Employers' pro/ts are usually not different from zero. Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions. We /nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-mic
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison (2005)
Working Paper: Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison (2004)
Journal Article: Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2003124

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