Learning and governance in inter-firm relations

No 38, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, the article presents a set of instruments that includes trust, next to instruments adopted and adapted from TCE. It also includes roles for gobetweens. Some references to empirical evidence are included.

JEL-codes: D23 D83 L14 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Date: Written 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations (2001)
Working Paper: Learning And Governance In Inter-Firm Relations (2004)
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