Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca (), Wieland Mueller and Hans-Theo Normann ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller

No 77, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.

JEL-codes: C72 C92 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Journal Article: Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200577

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