Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market

Werner Gueth, Wieland Mueller and Jan Potters
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller and Werner Güth ()

No 92, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).

Keywords: preemption; endogenous timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (2005)
Journal Article: Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200592

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