A Dynamic Auction for Differentiated Items under Price Rigidities

Dolf Talman () and Z.F. Yang
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Z.F. Yang: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2007-26, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one item. The price of each item is not completely flexible and is restricted to some admissible interval. In such a market economy with price rigidities, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. To facilitate the allocation of items to the bidders, we propose an ascending auction with rationing that yields a constrained Walrasian equilibrium outcome. The auctioneer starts with the lower bound price vector that specifies the lowest admissible price for each item, and each bidder responds with a set of items demanded at those prices. The auctioneer adjusts prices upwards for a minimal set of over-demanded items and chooses randomly a winning bidder for any item if the item is demanded by several bidders and its price has reached its highest admissible price. We prove that the auction finds a constrained Walrasian equilibrium outcome in a finite number of steps.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2007
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Journal Article: A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities (2008)
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