Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

Dall'Aglio, M., R. Brânzei and S.H. Tijs
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S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2008-101, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper defines models of cooperation among players partition- ing a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooper- ating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the di- vision.

JEL-codes: C71 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2008101

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