Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

Alparslan-Gok, S.Z., R. Branzei and S.H. Tijs
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S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2008-17, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008
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