Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

Jaap H. Abbring (), Pierre Chiappori () and T. Zavadil
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T. Zavadil: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2008-77, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives to avoid claims that are generated by the Dutch experience-rating scheme, and their effects on claim times and sizes under moral hazard. We develop tests that exploit these structural implications of moral hazard and experience rating. Unlike much of the earlier literature, we find evidence of moral hazard.

JEL-codes: D82 G22 C41 C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-ias
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200877

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