Dividend Policies in an Unregulated Market: The London Stock Exchange 1895-1905

Fabio Braggion () and L. Moore
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L. Moore: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2008-83, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We examine the e¤ects of dividend policies on 469 British firms between 1895 and 1905. These firms operated in an environment of very low taxation and an absence of institutional constraints. We find strong support for asymmetric information/signaling theories of dividend policy, and little support for agency models. Our results suggest that dividends can signal information from managers to shareholders, even if dividend payments incur only very low taxes. However, taxes appear to be necessary to allow dividend policies to resolve agency problems between managers and investors.

JEL-codes: N23 G14 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200883

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