Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

R. Brânzei, Dall'Aglio, M. and S.H. Tijs
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S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2008-97, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fur Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 { A 159] that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008
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