Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation

Ernesto Reuben () and Sigrid Suetens

No 2009-22, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called endgame effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which endgame effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.

JEL-codes: C91 D01 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2009
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=94777 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200922

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Series data maintained by Corry Stuyts ().