On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game

Hassan Benchekroun () and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri ()

No 2009-23, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.

JEL-codes: Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200923

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