Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing

Jan Boone, Wieland Müller and Sigrid Suetens

No 2009-30, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion". Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.

JEL-codes: C91 L12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-com, nep-exp and nep-mic
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing (2009)
Working Paper: Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200930

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