Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

T.D. Andersson, C. Andersson and Dolf Talman ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tommy Andersson

No 2010-51, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unitdemand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the exact auction mechanism in Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford- Fulkerson method, proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150, 1994), reduce to special cases of EDAA.

JEL-codes: C62 D44 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders (2012)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:201051

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