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Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with Identical Anonymous Best-Replies

C. Gonzalez-Alcon, Peter Borm () and R.L.P. Hendrickx
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R.L.P. Hendrickx: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

No 2011-138, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

Keywords: trimatrix games; Nash equilibrium; best-reply correspondences; symmetric games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2011
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