EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with Identical Anonymous Best-Replies
Peter Borm R.L.P. Hendrickx
Additional contact information
R.L.P. Hendrickx: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.
Keywords: trimatrix games; Nash equilibrium; best-reply correspondences; symmetric games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link) http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=121208 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found Related works: Working Paper: Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with Identical Anonymous Best-Replies (2011) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011138
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Series data maintained by Richard Broekman ().