The effects of takeover threats of shareholders and firm value

Marco Haan () and Yohanes Eko Riyanto ()

No 199912, CCSO Working Papers from University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using Aghion and Tirole\'s (1997) model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager\'s actions, since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor, and steps in if a profit opportunity exists. In our model, a takeover threat decreases the manager\'s effort and does not benefit shareholders. The effect of a takeover threat on the expected value of the firm is ambiguous. It is in the interest of the corporate raider if severance payments the manager receives upon being fired are high. Shareholders, however, prefer them to be low.

Date: 1999

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Related works:
Working Paper: The effects of takeover threats of shareholders and firm value (2000)
Journal Article: The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value (2006)
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