Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences

Bezalel Peleg (), Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
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Ton Storcken: METEOR

No 25, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.

Keywords: mathematical economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003

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Related works:
Working Paper: Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (2003)
Journal Article: Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2003025

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