The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

No 18, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

Keywords: mathematical economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2004
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Related works:
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2003)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2008)
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007)
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