Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

Dinko Dimitrov (), Claus-Jochen Haake () and Bettina Klaus ()

No 27, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents'' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-mic
Date: Written
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (2006)
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