Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Bettina Klaus ()

No 28, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theore m 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2005)
Journal Article: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005028

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