Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models

Bezalel Peleg () and Hans Peters
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Hans Peters: METEOR

No 30, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equalchance lotteries to a finite lottery model---i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries---which has a Nash consistentrepresentation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteriesare evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models (2005)
Journal Article: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005030

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