Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms

Olivier Bochet ()

No 36, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackson and Palfrey, 2001).

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms (2005)
Journal Article: Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms (2007)
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