EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities
László Á. Kóczy
Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Bloch (1996) presents a novel method to solve cooperative games with externalities. When trying to relate this to classical approaches he could only present negative results. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch''s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.
Keywords: Economics; (Jel:; A) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc Citations View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link) http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1201 (application/pdf)
Related works: Journal Article: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (2009) Working Paper: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (2008) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006047
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Series data maintained by Charles Bollen ().