Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities

László Á. Kóczy ()

No 47, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: Bloch (1996) presents a novel method to solve cooperative games with externalities. When trying to relate this to classical approaches he could only present negative results. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch''s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

Keywords: Economics; (Jel:; A) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (2009)
Working Paper: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006047

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