Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

László Á. Kóczy ()

No 49, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Keywords: Economics; (Jel:; A) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006049

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