One-dimensional bargaining with unanimity rule

Arkadi Predtetchinski
Additional contact information
Arkadi Predtetchinski: METEOR

No 11, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: The paper examines bargaining over a one--dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of delta-equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response stage.We show that along any sequence of delta-equilibria, as delta converges to one, the proposal of each player converges to the same limit. The limit, called the bargaining outcome, is uniquely determined by the set of players, the recognition probabilities, and the utility functions, and it is independent of the choice of the sequence. We characterize the bargaining outcome as a unique solution of a characteristic equation.

Keywords: mathematical economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1230 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Series data maintained by Charles Bollen ().