Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Rakesh Vohra and Birgit Heydenreich
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Birgit Heydenreich: METEOR

No 17, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.

Keywords: computer science applications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007)
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2008)
Journal Article: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2009)
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