Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

No 23, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein''s group identification problem.

Keywords: mathematical economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: Judgment aggregation without full rationality (2008)
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation without full rationality (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007023

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