Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz and Rakesh Vohra
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Rakesh Vohra: METEOR

No 1, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.

Keywords: computer science applications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007)
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007)
Journal Article: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2009)
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