Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility

Csóka Péter, Herings P. Jean-Jacques, László Á. Kóczy () and Miklós Pintér ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arno Riedl

No 31, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

Abstract: We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of II-balanced, totally II-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

Keywords: operations research and management science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility (2009)
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